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The causes of the sharp  decline in  credit  to the  private  sector in the  crisis-
stricken countries  of East  Asia (as documented,  for instance,  by Alba et al.
(1999)) continues  to  generate  much  controversy  among economists.  Some
observers  have  argued  that  the  fall in  bank  credit  resulted  from  a  credit
crunch, that  is, increased incidence of credit rationing.  Others have suggested
that  the decline in bank  loans may have resulted  instead  from the reduction
in the demand for credit,  itself a consequence of the contraction  in aggregate
demand  and  the fall in output  that  accompanied  the crisis.
Whether  a contraction  in domestic credit is due to supply or demand fac-
tors  has, of course,  important  implications  for monetary  and  fiscal policies.
If banks are unwilling to lend because, for instance,  of a perceived increase in
the risk of default  that  cannot  be internalized  by raising the cost of borrow-
ing, attempts  to increase liquidity and force interest  rates down to stimulate
aggregate demand and the demand for loans will prove largely ineffective. By
contrast,  if banks  are  unable to  lend (because  firms are curtailing  their  de-
mand for credit  as a result,  for instance,  of a perceived weakening in future
demand  and  thus  lower profits),  easing the  fiscal stance  may help  expand
aggregate demand  and generate  an expansion in credit.
Recent attempts  at determining  whether the fall in bank  credit  in Asia's
crisis-stricken countries resulted from supply or demand factors have provided
mixed results.  Several papers  have used survey evidence on changes in bank
lending and firm borrowing during the crisis to assess the incidence of a credit
crunch.  Some of the better-known  studies  include those  of Domac and  Ferri
(1999a),  Dollar  and  Hallward-Driemeier  (1998),  Dwor-Frecaut,  Hallward-
Driemeier, and Colaco (1999), and Ito and Pereira da Silva (1999). The latter
study, in particular,  used survey data  for commercial banks to argue in favor
of a  credit  crunch in Thailand  during  the  period  extending  from mid-1997
2(immediately  after  the  inception of the  crisis)  to early  1998.1 By contrast,
Dollar and Hallward-Driemeier  (1998) found little evidence of a credit  crunch
in  Thailand-in  the  sense of firms with  orders  but  unable  to  get credit  to
finance  working capital  needs.  The  evidence that  they  gathered  suggests,
on the contrary,  that  constraining  factors  on output  expansion  appeared  to
have  been  weak perceived  demand  and  the  sharp  increase  in  the  price  of
imported  inputs  resulting  from the large nominal exchange rate  depreciation
that occurred in the months following the crisis. 2 Along the same lines, Dwor-
FRecaut, Hallward-Driemeier,  and  Colaco  (1999) analyzed  the  results  of a
survey conducted  between  November 1998 and  February  1999 in Indonesia,
Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines,  and Thailand  of 3,700 firms, covering major
manufacturing  and  export  sectors.  They  found that  at  prevailing  interest
rates,  credit  availability in the aggregate was not seen by the surveyed firms
as a  major  constraint  on production  plans.  They  concluded  therefore  that
the  fall in credit  was demand-driven.
Because survey evidence can be seriously biased-for  instance,  tight credit
can reduce demand,  and lack of demand  may be perceived as the main proW
lem by respondents-several  other  studies  have relied  on other  methodolo-
gies.  Domac and  Ferri  (1999b), for instance,  used a  conceptual  framework
based on the  "credit  view" of monetary  policy to analyze the existence of a
credit crunch in Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines,  and Thailand.3
'As noted by Ito and Pereira da Silva  (1999), if the nominal credit stock is deflated by a
composite index consisting  of consumer prices and the nominal exchange rate (in order to
account for the fact that a significant  share of the loans provided by Thai commercial  banks
and finance companies  just before the crisis were denominated in foreign currency and the
book value of these loans was recorded at the current exchange rate), the deceleration in
the rate of growth of real credit to the private sector was quite dramatic in that  country:
a year-on-year contraction of -2.4 percent in August 1997,  -5.3 percent in October, -12.2
percent in November and -18 percent in December (Ito and Pereira da Silva (1999, p. 14)).
21t should also be noted that  in Thailand, firms had contracted large amounts of un-
hedged short-term  debt  on world capital markets  and were thus  highly vulnerable to
currency depreciation; see Alba et al. (1999).
3See Walsh (1998, Chapter 7) for a detailed discussion  of the credit channel of monetary
policy, particularly the role of informational asymmetries.
3Specifically,  they argued that  a widening of the  spread between the lend-
ing rate and a representative rate on risk-free  assets while at the same time
real bank credit is falling represents prima facie evidence that  the demand
for loans could not have declined by more than the supply of credit.  They
found evidence (based on the spread between bank lending rates and cor-
porate bonds) consistent with this view and thus concluded that  the credit
crunch was widespread, affecting particularly small-sized firms, for whom
close  substitutes for bank credit are unavailable. 4
By contrast, Ghosh and Ghosh (1999)  used a switching  regression  frame-
work  for analyzing  the behavior of real private credit in Korea and Indonesia.
They estimated both supply and demand functions  for credit and determined,
for each period, whether supply or demand was the constraining factor. They
found that,  in Indonesia (where the crisis started in September 1997),  there
was evidence  of a credit crunch in the third and fourth quarters of 1997. By
the end of the first of 1998, however, the decline in actual credit reflected
mostly the fall in the demand for loans induced by the deepening  recession.
Similarly,  in Korea (where the crisis started a month later) they found evi-
dence of a credit crunch in the last quarter of 1997,  but from the first quarter
of 1998 onward, the constraining factor appears to have been the  demand
for credit. Thus, and in contrast to the survey-based  evidence, the study by
Ghosh and Ghosh provides evidence of both demand and supply factors at
play: the fall in private sector lending in East Asia (at least in Korean and
Indonesia) may have been the result of bank tightening of credit supply in
the first stage, and a drop in borrower  demand in the second stage.
This paper attempts  to shed additional light on the current controversy
by proposing a two-step econometric approach.  The first step is based on
4It  should  be  noted,  however, that  spreads  can  increase  for a variety  of reasons.  For
instance,  in the  model  of Agenor and  Aizenman  (1998), an increase  in spreads  may  result
from an expected rise in monitoring  costs associated  with lending operations.  An expected
tightening  in prudential  regulations  requiring  banks  to hold  more  liquid  assets  may  also
lead to higher spreads, to the extent that these assets yield lower returns (and thus lower
income) than  other  assets  that  the  banks  would have chosen otherwise.
4the  estimation  of a  demand  function  for excess reserves  (or  liquid  assets)
by commercial banks  that  captures,  in particular,  the precautionary  motive
for holding nonremunerated  assets.  The  second step  consists  in  establish-
ing  dynamic  projections  for the  periods  following the  crisis  and  assessing
whether  actual  values of excess reserves are  "close enough"  (in a statistical
sense that  is made  more precise below)  to  those  predicted  by  a stable  re-
gression model.  If that  is the case, the increase in actual  holdings of excess
reserves can be construed  as consistent  with  a supply-induced  reduction  in
credit; if that  is not the case, the accumulation  of excess liquid assets can be
seen as  "involuntary"-in  which case the  slowdown in credit  is more likely
to reflect a reduction  in demand.  Underlying our approach  is the view that
increased incidence of rationing-particularly  of the more risky categories of
borrowers-may  take the  form of increases in excess reserve holdings moti-
vated,  in the  context  of a  crisis, by higher perceived uncertainty  or risk of
default.  Greater  volatility  of deposits  (relative  to  currency  holdings)  and
increased riskiness of lending, in particular,  may also prompt  banks  to hold
higher levels of precautionary  excess reserves.
The remainder  of the paper is structured  as follows. Section II presents
a theoretical  model of the demand  for excess liquid reserves  by commercial
banks  in the  presence of both  liquidity risk  and real  sector  volatility.  The
impact  of various  variables  (including  required reserves  and  funding costs)
on  the  demand  for excess reserves  is also  analyzed.  Section  III  presents
estimates  of the  resulting  demand  equation  for Thailand;  it  also discusses
the in-sample properties  of the model.  Section IV examines the performance
of the  dynamic  forecasts generated  by the model and  analyzes  whether the
regression  forecasts  are consistent  with  the  hypothesis  of a  credit  crunch.
The last section summarizes the results  and offers some concluding remarks.
52  A Model  of Excess  Liquid  Assets
At the heart of our analysis of the factors underlying the fall in credit  in East
Asia is a model  of excess liquid  reserves.  As is well known from  the  early
literature  surveyed  by Baltensperger  (1980), Santomero  (1984)  and  Swank
(1996), reserve  management  models  deal with  a bank's  funding  or liquid-
ity  risk.  To manage  this  type of risk,  and  in  deciding how much cash and
other liquid assets they should hold, banks internalize the fact that  they can
draw funds from either  the interbank  market  or the  central  bank  in case of
unexpected  contingencies.
To begin with, consider the following simple model of reserve management
(Baltensperger  (1980)).  Assume that  there  is only  one representative  bank
whose deposits  D  are given exogenously.  The bank  must  decide  upon  the
level of liquid, non-interest  bearing reserve assets,  R, and  non-reserve assets,
which take  the form of illiquid loans,  L.  Its balance sheet is given by
R+L  = D.  (1)
Reserves are necessary because the bank  is exposed to liquidity risk.  De-
posit  flows u  E  (UL,  UH)  occur  randomly  according  to  a  density  function
0 = b'.  When the net outflow of cash exceeds the reserves, u >  R, the bank
must  face illiquidity  costs  that  are taken  to  be proportional  to  the  reserve
deficiency max(0, u - R).  Put  differently, in case of illiquidity  the bank  must
borrow the missing reserves at a penalty  rate  q, with  q >  rL,  where rL is the
interest  rate  on loans.  Let rD denote  the  deposit  rate;  the  bank's  profit is
thus
1I  = rLL - rDD - qmax(O,u  -R),
which implies that  the bank's  expected profit is
E(II)  = rLL  - rDD  - q  (u - R)O(u)du,  (2)
that  is, using (1):
E(fl)  =  (rL-rD)D-rLR-q  |  (u-R)O(u)du.  (3)
6Assuming risk neutrality,  the optimal  level of reserves  is determined  so
as to maximize expected profits.  The necessary condition  is thus:5
(9E(ll)
that  isR=  -rL  + q[l-  (R)I  = 0,
that is
R* =  ,-l (q  rL)q  (4)
q
Equation  (4) implies that  the  marginal  opportunity  cost of holding  an
extra  unit  of reserves, rL, is equated  to  the marginal  reduction  in liquidity
costs.  Optimal  reserves decrease with the lending rate  rL and increase with
the penalty  rate  q.
6
For our purpose here, we extend  this simple model in several directions,
following in  part  Prisman  and  Slovin  (1986).  Specifically, we account  for
required  reserves, the  link between the  demand  for cash  and  deposits,  and
output  shocks.  Suppose that  the demand  for loans, L, is negatively related
to the lending rate  and  proportional  to expected output,  ye:
L =  f(rL)Ye,  f'  < 0.  (5)
Similarly, the supply of deposits by the public, D, is taken to be positively
related  to the deposit rate and  proportional  to expected  output:
D  =9(rD)ye,  9' > 0.  (6)
Suppose that  agents determine  L and D at the beginning of each period,
before the realization of shocks to output.  In addition,  there is a demand  for
cash determined  at the end of the period, following the realization  of output
and  liquidity  shocks.  The  bank  is required  to  maintain  liquid  reserves  in
5Because E(II) is concave  in R, the necessary  condition is also sufficient.
6Moreover, if the distribution  function  of deposit flows can be approximated  by a normal
distribution,  reserves can be shown to be proportional  to the  variance of deposit  flows (see
Baltensperger  (1980)).
7proportion  to its deposit base, at the interest  rate r.  Let 0 denote the reserve
requirement  rate  and  R  total  reserves; excess reserves, Z,  are thus  given by
Z = R-OD,
that  is, using (1) to  eliminate R,
Z = (1-9)D-L,  (7)
With  C  denoting  currency  holdings,  the  equilibrium  condition  of the
money market  is given by
C+D=  kY,  k>O,  (8)
where k is the reciprocal of velocity (assumed constant  in what  follows) and
Y realized output.
Suppose that  the demand for cash is also proportional  to realized output;
specifically, let us assume that
c  c  kY,  (9)
1+  c
where  c  =  C/D.  We will assume  in  what  follows that  both  output  and
ck/(l  + c) are random  and  given by
Y =  Ye(1  + e),  1 2+=A(1  +  )  (10)
where E and  6 are random  shocks.  Using (9) and  (10), the demand  for cash
can be rewritten  as
C = AkY'(1  + e)(1 +  ).  (11)
For simplicity of exposition,  suppose that  the composite  term  (1 + E) (1 +
(),  denoted  x,  is normally  distributed  with  constant  mean  i  and  constant
variance a
2:
x = (1 +  )(1 +  (N(M,  82).  (12)
8To meet  unexpected  withdrawals  (unanticipated  demand  for cash),  the
bank  now can not only borrow at a penalty  rate  of q, as in the simple model
presented  above, but  it may also use its excess reserves,  Z.  Using (7), the
expected reserve deficiency is thus  now given by
E max[O,  C-  ((1 -O)D  - L)].
Using this result, together with (5), (6), (8), and (11), the bank's expected
profits can be written  as
1I =  [rf  (rL)  - rDg(rD)jYe  + rR  - qEmax[O, C-((1-0)D-L)].  (13)
Assuming that  the  functions  f (.)  and  g(*) are quasi-concave functions,
the following propositions  can be established:
Proposition  1  An  increase in the penalty rate increases deposits and lend-
ing rates, as well as excess reserves held by commercial banks.
Proposition  2  An  increase in  the volatility of output  and liquidity shocks
has ambiguous effects on the deposit rate,  the lending rate,  and  excess re-
serves.  If  the initial level of the penalty rate is sufficiently  high, an increase
in volatility has a positive effect on all three variables.
Proposition  3  An  increase in  the reserve  requirement rate unambiguously
raises the lending rate and lowers excess reserves.  If  the degree of volatility
is not too high, it also raises the deposit rate.
Proof  of the  results  summarized  in  these  propositions  are  provided  in
Appendix A. Proposition I implies that,  for a high enough level of the penalty
rate,  excess reserves will exceed expected  withdrawals,  that  is, .Z - i  >  0.
Under such conditions,  Propositions  1, 2 and  3 can be combined  to  lead to
the following demand function for excess reserves:
Z=Z(q,l  ).  (14)
Equation  (14) forms the basis of our empirical investigation.
93  Application  to  Thailand
As noted in the introduction, the first step of our approach to assessing  the
extent to which the credit crunch that  East Asian countries experienced in
the immediate aftermath of their financial crisis was a supply or demand-
induced phenomenon consists in estimating a demand function for excess
liquid reserves by commercial  banks. We apply our procedure to Thailand,
a country where the contraction in credit was particularly severe and the
increase in excess liquid assets held by the banking system very large (see
below).
Equation (14) can be viewed  as providing  a static benchmark specification
for desired, as opposed to  actual, excess reserves. This benchmark specifi-
cation is estimated in a fairly general dynamic setting to allow the model
to  capture the  dynamics present in the data.7 Specifcally,  the  estimated
demand equation for excess reserves by banks is expressed by the following
autoregression,  which accounts  for contemporaneous  as well  as lagged  effects:
ln(  )E  ai(L) In( EL ) + a2(L) In( RR ) + a3(L)CVC/D  + a4(L)CVy/yT
±a5(L)  ln(-)  + a6(L)r  +  vt,
YT
where vt is a well-behaved error term  and aj(L)  are lag polynomials,  defined
as
al(L)  =  a11L +  ...  +  a1pLP,
aj(L)=1+aj1L+...+ajpLP,  j>2,
where L is the lag operator.  The dependent  variable is the logarithm  of the
ratio  of excess liquid assets held by commercial banks,  EL,  over total  bank
deposits,  D.  The  regressors are  lagged values of  (the  log of)  the  ratio  of
excess reserves to deposits; current  and lagged values of (the log of) the ratio
7In the  next  section,  this  dynamic  model  is used  to generate  forecasts  of the  demand
factors and  the dynamic  adjustment  of movements in the  demand for excess liquid reserves
by commercial  banks.
10of required  liquid assets, RR,  to  total  bank  deposits,  D; current  and lagged
values of the  coefficient of variation  of the  cash-to-deposit  ratio,  C/D,  and
the deviation  of output  from trend,  Y/YT;  and current  and  lagged values of
the discount rate,  r, which corresponds  to the penalty  rate  identified in (14).
As noted by Van't  Dack (1999), the discount window has been the last resort
facility for banks  and finance companies in Thailand.8
The  above specification captures  the main features  of the model derived
earlier.9 In particular,  In RR/D  captures  the impact of reserve requirements
as  derived  in  equation  (14);  CVC/D  and  Vy/yT account  for the  impact  of
volatility and liquidity risk, and thus the precautionary  effect on the demand
for reserves,  as emphasized in  (14).  The penalty  rate,  r,  is proxied by two
interest  rates.  The first is the discount rate;  as noted  by Van't  Dack (1999),
the  discount window has been  the last  resort  facility for banks  and  finance
companies  in  Thailand.  The  second  is the  money  market  rate  which,  to
some extent,  also reflected the  cost  of liquidity  in the  market.  Notice  also
that  the  dynamics  of adjustment  of the  demand  of EL/D  is captured  by
the lagged values of ln(EL/D)  in the regression.  In addition,  the regression
includes  ln(Y/YT)  to proxy for changes in the  demand  for cash.  A cyclical
downturn,  for instance,  would lead banks to  anticipate  lower, transactions-
related,  demand for currency by the public and would therefore  lead them to
decrease their holdings of excess reserves. The lags account for the possibility
8Appendix  B provides  a more detailed  description  of these variables  and  identifies  our
data sources.
9The contemporaneous  regressors  included  in the  autoregression  are  generally  exoge-
nous to  the  commercial  bank's  demand  for excess  liquidity.  This  is the  case  for reserve
requirements  that  are set  by the  authorities,  the volatilities  of CID  and  Y/YT  that  reflect
deposit  holder's  preferences and  the  volatility  of the  cyclical position,  and  the  cyclical po-
sition  of the  economy Y/YT.  Note  that  the  quantity  of (excess) liquidity  and  the  penalty
rate,  as  measured  by the  money  market  rate,  may  be jointly  determined  together  with
the  supply  of liquidity  to  commercial  banks.  This suggests  that  OLS  estimates  could  be
subject  to simultaneity  bias.  However, note  also that  the estimation  results  obtained  with
the  discount  rate  (which  is more  likely to  be  predetermined)  are  not  very  different,  as
discussed  below.  This  suggests  that  if there  is any  simultaneity  bias,  it  is likely  to  be
small.
11of a gradual  impact  of funding  costs and  cyclical movements  in output  on
the demand  for excess reserves.
Figure  1 displays the  evolution  of some of the variables  included  in the
regression  equation  during  the  period  1992-98.  The  first  panel  shows the
evolution  of the  ratio  of excess liquid  assets  (obtained  as the  difference be-
tween actual  and required liquid assets) to bank deposits.10 The figure shows
that  excess liquid assets started  to increase significantly well before the crisis
(as early as late  1996), rising quite dramatically  in the  immediate  aftermath
of the  currency  and  financial  turmoil  that  began  with  the  devaluation  of
the baht  in July  1997. At the same time,  the cyclical component  of output
turned  sharply  negative.  The figure also shows that  the  money market  rate
fluctuated  considerably  during  the  period  1992-98--exceeding  at  times  the
discount rate  and falling well below it at other times.  Finally, both  the ratio
of credit to  the private  sector to deposits,  and the ratio  of currency  in circu-
lation  to  deposits,  increased  at first  and  subsequently  fell in  the  aftermath
of the crisis.
Table 1 presents  the summary  of the estimation  results  of the autoregres-
sion using ordinary least squares based on monthly data  and  using the entire
sample ending  in September  1998. The  table  reports  the  sum  of the  coeffi-
cients and  their  standard  errors of the lags of the regressors included  in the
estimation  since individual  coefficients in the autoregression  are difficult to
interpret  directly.  Conceptually,  the sum of the  coefficients are obtained  by
estimating  the dynamic model and then setting  L = 1. Thus, the sum of the
coefficients reported  in the table  correspond to the long-run effects once they
have been appropriately  scaled by:  1 - al(1).  In other  words, Table 1 shows
10As noted  in Sirivedhin  (1998), prudential  regulations  in Thailand  around  the  time of
the  crisis  required  commercial  banks  to  hold liquid  assets  (averaged  over a  fortnight)  of
not  less than  seven  percent  of their  deposit  base;  eligible  assests  included  at  least  two
percent  non-interest-bearing  deposits  at  the  Bank of Thailand,  a maximum  of 2.5 percent
cash in vault,  and  (making  up  the  remainder)  bonds  issued by the  government,  approved
state  enterprises,  specialized  financial  institutions  or the  Bank  of Thailand.
12summarizes  the long-run effects on the demand  for ln(EL/D).' 1 The more
traditional  method to examine long-run effects, cointegration  analysis, is not
carried out here because of the short time period spun by the data  sample.12
Moreover for the purpose at hand of providing a empirical framework to gen-
erate forecasts of ln(EL/D)  within the framework provided by equation  (14),
a reduced from autoregression will contain all of the information  in the data
without taking a stand on critical issues such as the number of unit roots and
cointegrating  vectors in the empirical model based on a fairly short  sample.
Consider the  main empirical results  when the penalty  rate,  r,  is the dis-
count rate  (panel A, Table  1).  The  estimation  results  are in general  con-
sistent  with  our priors although  the precision (ratio  of the coefficient to its
standard  error)  with  which these effects are measured  is low.'3 In particu-
lar, ln(RR/D)  appears to have a negative impact on ln(EL/D)  as expected,
the volatility of ln(C/D),  as proxied by CVC/D,  tends  to increase ln(EL/D),
and the effect of an increase in the penalty  rate,  r,  is to  increase ln(EL/D).
The sum of the coefficients on the cyclical component  of output  on the  de-
mand of EL/D  confirms the role that  cyclical conditions have on ln(EL/D),
and  in contrast  these  effects are  precisely measured.  Note  also that  these
results  are not affected when the volatility  of C/D  and/or  Y/YT  is dropped
from the  regression as evidence by columns 2 and  3.  However, the  volatil-
ity of Y/YT,  as proxied by CVY/YT, is incorrectly  signed and  not  measured
precisely.  It  is not  clear what  is behind  this  implied perverse  effect of the
volatility  of Y/YT,  although  the  increase in  the precision  of the measured
effect of ln(Y/YT) when CVY/YT  is dropped from the regression (column 2) is
'1The results  presented  in Table  1 correspond  to p = 3.  Where appropriate  the  robust-
ness of these results  is discussed for p = 6; the  model is unstable  for p >  6.
"2See  Civeir  and  Parikh  (1995) for an  estimation  based  on  cointegration  analysis  for
credit  and  demand  for reserves.
'3These results  are reasonably  robust,  and  qualitatively  do not  change  when the  model
is estimated  with p = 6.  The only effect that  is somewhat  less robust  is the  effect of the
penalty  rate  on excess reserves,  which is positive  (as in Table  1) only when  CVCID and
CVy/y,  are included  in the  regression, that  is, columns  (1) and  (4).
13suggestive of the difficulty in separating  the effects of the output  cycle from
the  volatility  in the  output  cycle.  Finally,  the  sum of the  coefficients and
the precision with which the effect of lagged EL/D  is measured  is suggestive
of significant dynamic  adjustment  by commercial banks  demand  for excess
liquidity.  Because qualitatively  the  results  obtained  when the  penalty  rate,
r,  is proxied by the money market  rate  (columns 4-6 , panel B, Table 1) are
fairly robust,  we discuss below refer only the estimates  shown in Panel  A. 14
Despite the  turbulence  associated  with  the Asian crisis in  1997-98, there
is very little  evidence that  this  translated  into instability  in the  estimated
parameters.  The  tests  proposed  by Andrews  (1993) were used  to  examine
the  stability  of the  estimates  because  the  date  of the  potential  change  in
the  parameters  is unknown.  The  test  boils down  to  choosing  the  largest
statistic  from a series of standard  Chow tests,  and  because  the break  point
is unknown the  distribution  of the  max-Chow  is non-standard.  The  Chow
tests  were performed from the beginning of 1995 to the end  of 1997, and  the
max-Chow are 74.13, 52.34 and 54.74 respectively for equations  1 through  3.
At standard  significance levels, these  tests  reject stability  in equation,  but
not  in equations  2 and 3 (see the tables  in Andrews  (1993)).  This  stability
result  is important  because  it implies that  the  difference between  the pre-
and  post-crisis  behavior  of excess liquid assets,  as predicted  by  the model,
can only reflect changes in the behavior  of the  determinants  of the demand
for these assets  (as captured  in the regression model),  as opposed to changes
in the parameters  characterizing  the behavior  of commercial banks.
Figure 2 shows the behavior of actual  and dynamic  forecasts of the ratio
of excess liquid assets to deposits, for each of the three  specifications in Table
1.15  The  dynamic  forecasts  are calculated  in-sample  beginning  in January
14In general,  the signs  of the estimated  coefficients  remains  unchanged;  the main dif-
ferences  are limited  to the size  of some  of the coefficients.  In particular, the effect  of r
(CVC/D)  in equation  (2) increases  (decreases)  dramatically,  from about 0.22  (1.17)  to 2.1
(0.14).  Also,  the effect  of ln(RR/D) falls  somewhat.
"Details of the calculations  of  the dynamic  forecasts  are specified  in the next section.
141994 and are calculated up to end of the sample period, October  1998. With
the exception of the forecasts for equation  (1), the model does a reasonable
job  of capturing  the increase in the ratio  of excess liquid assets  during  the
early part  of 1996. It  is interesting  that  the forecasts for equations  (2) and
(3) track  the  data  fairly well, suggesting that  the  volatility  of the ratio  of
cash to deposits,  CVC/D, does not appear to be the leading factor explaining
the increases in the ratio  of excess liquid assets.
4  Dynamic  Forecasts
The second step of our approach to assessing the existence of a credit  crunch
in Thailand  in the aftermath  of its economic and  financial crisis consists in
establishing dynamic forecasts for the period July  1997 onward and assessing
whether the  forecast errors from the predictions  of the  regression model of
excess liquid assets estimated  in the previous section (that  is, the difference
between actual  and projected values) are small enough to be consistent with
the predicted path  of reserves, or on the contrary  large enough to be viewed
as indicators  of "involuntary" accumulation of excess reserves-which  would
be more consistent  with a demand-induced slowdown in credit.
Dynamic  forecasts  are obtained  by using the  estimates  underlying  the
results in colurmn  3 panel A, Table 1, our preferred specification.  Specifically,
the  dynamic  forecasts are obtained  as the expected  value  of the  empirical
model:
E[ln( D  )t+h  I  Qt] = & 1(L) ln(  D )t+h  +  d 2(L)  In(  D  )t+h
+& 5(L) ln(-)t+h  +  &;(L)rt+h,
VT
where Qt  is a vector containing the information set used to make the forecasts
h-periods ahead, specifically
Qt = [Et- 8 [ln(EL/D)t-,+iI,  ln(RR/D)t+j,  ln(Y/YT)t+j,  rt+j]
15with s  =  1,2,...,p,  and j  =  0,1,...,h;  and a '^'  indicates estimated val-
ues of the corresponding lag polynomials. Thus, for forecasts of the  first
month, July 1997, the forecast is calculated by taking the  actual values of
ln(EL/D)  in June 1997 and previous months, and the actual values of the
other regressors (ln(RR/D),  ln(Y/YT),  and r) in July and their lagged val-
ues. Forecasts for subsequent months are obtained by taking the forecasted
value of ln(EL/D)  for the previous  month and the actual values of the other
regressors, so that previous forecasts of ln(EL/D)  feed into its subsequent
forecasts. The standard errors of the forecasts are obtained ignoring  the sam-
pling variance, as is standard practice (see Granger and Newbold (1986, p.
158), and Doan (1996,  pp. 14-76)).
Figure 3 shows  the behavior of the observed ln(EL/D)  and the dynamic
forecasts for each of the three specifications  in Table 1 of the ratio of excess
liquid assets to deposits for the period July 1997  to October 1998, together
with one- (upper panel) and two-standard error bands (lower  panel). Exclud-
ing the results for equation (1), what comes out clearly from the dynamic
forecasts in Figure 3 that both in the immediate aftermath of the crisis and
subsequently,  actual values are about what could be expected from the model
and do not seem to diverge dramatically what could be expected from fore-
casts of the  model and their associated error.  For equation (1), however,
actual values diverge from their forecasted values; judging from the  one-
standard error band this occurs in January/February  1998, whereas with a
two-standard error band this occurs a couple of months latter.  After that
actual values of ln(EL/D)  grow  increasingly,  well outside the error bands.
In sum, within the framework  of our general hypothesis  it appears that the
persistent increase in excess  reserve holdings by commercial  banks following
the collapse  of the baht appears to have reflected  a supply-side  phenomenon,
that is, higher excess liquid assets consistent with bank behavior.  This, of
course, is conditional on our claim that our regression  model captures well
the higher perceived  degree of uncertainty or risk of default in the aftermath
16of the crisis.
5  Summary  and  Concluding  Remarks
The  purpose  of this  paper  has been to  propose  an  alternative  approach  to
examining the extent  to which the fall in credit that  characterized  most crisis-
stricken  countries  in  East  Asia reflected a  credit  crunch,  that  is,  increased
incidence of credit  rationing  by banks.  We began by developing  a demand
function  for excess reserves (or liquid assets)  by commercial banks that  cap-
tured,  in particular,  the  impact  of reserve requirements,  funding  costs,  and
precautionary  motives related to liquidity risk and output  volatility.  We then
estimated  a dynamic version of the model and showed that  the stability  of the
model cannot  be rejected  using standard  tests.  We then  used the  model to
establish dynamic projections  for the post-crisis period  (July 1997 to October
1998). Our general assumption  is that  if actual  values of excess reserves are
within  one- or two-standard  error  bands,  the observed reduction  in credit  is
consistent  with  a supply-side phenomenon.  On the contrary, if actual  values
are outside  the errors bands,  this  can be  construed  as evidence of "involun-
tary"  accumulation  of excess reserves; the slowdown in credit  may thus more
likely reflect a reduction  in the  demand  for loans-possibly  reflecting firms'
perceived weaknesses in future demand  for their  products.
Our results  suggest that  the fall in bank lending in Thailand  seems to have
been  a reflection of a supply phenomenon,  as argued  by those  who believe
in the credit  crunch hypothesis.  Overall, therefore,  our results  are consistent
with  those  obtained  by Ito  and  Pereira  da  Salva (1999) and  with  those  of
Domag and  Ferri  (1999a),  whose study  indicates  that  small  and  medium-
sized firms in Thailand  faced binding constraints  in accessing credit  markets
in the  aftermath  of the crisis.  It  would be useful to  apply the  methodology
developed  here to  other  crisis-stricken  countries  in East  Asia; whether  this
would prove fruitful or not remains to be seen.  As noted by Domac and Ferri
17(1999b),  in particular, in Indonesia the ratio of excess reserves to deposits
did not display the same sharp increase observed in Thailand.
18Appendix  A
Derivation of Propositions  1 to  3
Assuming that the functions f(.)  and g(Q)  are quasi-concave,  the results
summarized in Propositions land 2 can be written as
dq  dq  dq
drL  drD  dZ
Lg  d'J1  g L  =dc  sg F-i = sg(Z-p).
To establish these results, we begin by rewriting (13), with ye  normalized
to unity, and using (1) to eliminate R, as
I  =  rLf(rL)-  rDg(rD)
±r[f(rL)  - g(rD)]  - qEmax[O, C  - ((l  - O)D - L)].
Assuming, as indicated in the text, that  x is normally distributed with
constant mean p, and constant variance o2, this expression can be rewritten
as
H =  rLf(rL)  - rDg(rD)
±r[f1(rL)-  g(rD)]  - {O)D-L  ((1 - 9)D  - L)}  (x)dx,
where 0  is the density function of x  (assumed normal).  Maximizing this
expression  with respect to the deposit and lending rates yields the first-order
conditions
HrLrL  =(rL-  r)f'  + f  - qf'  {1-  ((  )D-  L  ) }  =  0,
HD  =(r  - rD)g'  - g + q(l  - O)g' {1  _  4  ((10  )D  L  -i)  }  = 
where 4 is the cumulative distribution function of x.
19Let  ED  =  rDg/lg  and  EL  =  -rLf'/f  denote,  respectively, the  elasticities
of the supply of deposits  by the public and the demand  for loans.  The above
expressions can be rewritten  as
rL-EL(rL-r)  +  qEL(l  -4)  =  0,
ED(r-rD)  -rD  +  qED(1  -0)(1  - )  =  0,
which imply that
r +q(l  -t)  r +q(l  -0)(1  - ()
'rL=  1-e;j  rD,-
1  L  1 +  D-
These expressions indicate,  in particular,  that  an increase  in the penalty
rate q raises both  the deposit and lending rates to an extent  that  is inversely
related to the  elasticity  of supply of deposits  and demand  for loans.
Let us assume that  the quantity  rLf(rL)  - rDg(rD)  +  r[g(rD)  - f(rL)]  is
quasi-concave in rL  and rD,  so thatl6
ff"  - 2(f')  <0 ,  gg" - 2(g')2 < 0.  (Al)
Under these  assumptions,  it can indeed be established  that  both  drL/dq
and  drD/dq are positive.  To do so, note that
HIrLrL  =  (L-  r)f'  + 2f'  - qf"(l  - 4)-q  (f  )
1 6 Let h(rL,  rD) be  defined as
h(rL,rD)  = rLf(rL)  - rDg(rD)  +  r[g(rD)  - f(rL)I.
We  have
hrL = f  + (rL  -r)f,
h  rL =  2f'  + rLf"  - rf"  = 2f'  +  (rL  -r)f",
so that  hrLIL  < 0 at  hrL  = 0. The latter  condition,  which is equivalent  to f+(rL-r)f'  =  0,
implies  that  rL  - r  =-f/f'.  Substituting  this  result  in the  definition  of  hrLrL  gives, at
hrL  =  0,
2f'  - f"flf'  <  0,
or equivalently  ff"  -2(fI)2  < 0.  Similar  derivations  yield the  second result  in (Al).
20DrD  (r-rD)g"-2g'  +q(l-)(1-)g"-q  )9 ]
flrLrD  - qf'=(l  - 9)g'  <  °
The effect of q on rL can be assessed from
E  [IrLrL  [IrLrD  I [  drL/dq  [  (1  - ?)f  1.  A2
fLrLrD  lIrDrD  I  L  drD/dq  [  L(1  - 9)(1  - g  (A2)
Let A be
A  =  "IrLrL 
1
rDrD  - rLrD
A is positive  from the  second-order conditions  for profit maximization.
We therefore  have
drL  -(1  {  [(1-  O)g]
2 q4f'[(l  _)gl]2
dq  IAI  or
where  r  is defined  as
r  =  (r - rD)g"-  2g' + q(1 - 0)(1  - 45)g".  (A3)
The above expression can be rewritten  as
drL  f'(l  - )r
dq  IAI
which implies that,  because f'  < 0, that
sg  drL  sg  [r]  (A4)
To show that  drL/dq  > 0 requires  therefore  showing that  r  <  0.  To do
so, note first  that  quasi-concavity of g(-) implies that  g" < 2(g')2/g,  so that
r  < (r-  rD)9"  -9  +  q(l  - 0)(1  - )g2,
21or equivalently
r <  I  {(r - rD)9'  - g + qg'(1 - 0)(1  -41)1
FRom  the first-order conditions for profit maximization,  the quantity  (r -
rD)g'  - g  is equal  to  -q(1  - 0)(1  - D)g'.  Substituting  this  result  on the
right-hand  side of the above expression implies that  the term  in brackets  is
zero and therefore  that  r  < 0.  Thus,  from (A4), drL/dq  > 0.
The effect of q on rD  can be assessed in a similar manner.  Specifically, it
can be established  that
drq 0 -(1 A  <(1  - 9)g'[(rL - r)f"  + 2f'  - qf"(1  _  _  ___  - _
+ q(f')2  (1 - 0)9}
or equivalently
drD  _  -(1  - 1-  O)g  {(rL  - r)f"  + 2f'  - qf"(1  - ?)
dq  I
Thus,
sg [dD j  ]  -sg  [(rL - r)f"  + 2f'  -qf"(1  - D)]  (A5)
Given the above definitions,
(rL-r)f"  + 2f'  - qf"(1-4)  =-f,  {-(rL-r)f'-2  (  )  + qf'(1  -ID)
FRom  the first-order conditions for profit maximization,  the term in brack-
ets on the right-hand  side of this  expression is also equal to
-f"  {-(rLr)f'-  2(f)2  +  (rL  -r)f'+  L}
which is equal to
- {L  - ),  - -ft  {f *  2(f')2}  < 0.
22Thus,  from (A5), drD/dq > 0.
The effect of q on excess reserves is straightforward;  it can be established
that,  given the above results,
dZ  -(1  )  ,drD  -drL  0
dq  dq  dq
Let  us establish  the  effects of a change in  a.  From a system  similar  to
(A2), we can establish  that
drLIda ]  =  [  qf'O(Z  - )la  LdrDldoa  J-q(l  - )g'O(Z -,)/a72  '
which implies that
drL/do  y  qj(Z  p)  1.
drD/da ] qa2  L-(1-O)g'  -
Thus
drL  q(Z-)  fr
This  result  implies that,  given the  sign assumptions,  and  given that,  as
shown above, r  < 0,
[dL 1a  sg  =drL  g(Z  - u).
It  can also be established  that
L  drD  1  [dZ]  z  sg [drDj = sg  dj=  sg(Z-_  ts).
Finally, let  us consider the effect of a change in  the reserve requirement
rate,  0, on interest  rates  and  excess reserves, as summarized  in Proposition
3. It can be shown that,  in a manner  analogous to  (A2),
FrLrL  HrLrD  I IF  1  [Ld  qf'g/la
[L  rD  HrDrD  J  L  drDI  -qo(l  - 9)g'g/o + q(l  - )9'  J
This  implies that,  using the definition of F given above in  (A3):
drL  q  0fg  9  -q(1-Pgo  (l  V
dG  ojL  I  o-  JAI
23from which it can be verified that,  given that  r  < 0, drL/dO > 0.
We also have
drD  q'f'gr  q(l  - b)g'
a1/\1+  A  rLrL,
that  is
drD  qgr (fr  r  9L  rL-  ±t  + 2f'  - qf"(  - ) - qkf') 
It can be established that  the term in parentheses  on the right-hand  side
is equivalent to
-f'(g"g  - 2(g') 2
-(l  - D)g' {  2f'2 - f"f  qq(f')2}
9  I  9  f'  a 
Given the  assumptions  specified given above, the  first  term  is negative
whereas the second is positive.  If the degree of volatility  is not too high (that
is, if a is small) the  first term will dominate and,  given that  r  <  0, we will
have drD/dO  > 0.
Finally,  to  assess  the impact  of 0 on  Z,  note  that  from the  first-order
conditions,
(rL  - r)f'  + f  = qf  {1  - }Z  )
which gives
-1  {rL  -r  + f,  - 1  )(  f
This expression implies that
g [dZo  1  dL  d(f  f')]
T~[O  dg 1 O-  dO  j
The expression in brackets on the right-hand  side can be rewritten  as
drL  d(f/f')  drL  f' drL  f  fIIdrL
dO  dO  f'  dO  (ft)2  dO
so that
drL  + d(f/f')  2_  f  f,l  drL  |2(f') 2 -f"f  drL
dO  dO  (f  )2  J(dO  t  (f)2  Jd
As shown earlier, drL/dO > 0; thus,  dZ/dO < 0.
24Appendix  B
Data  Sources  and  Definitions
The data  used in this study  are at a monthly frequency and cover the pe-
riod January  1992 to October  1998. The variables are defined and measured
as follows.
- Excess liquid assets, EL,  are from Bank of Thailand.
- Required liquid assets, RR,  are from Bank of Thailand.
- Total deposits,  D, are the sum of demand, time,  and savings deposits in
deposit  money banks.  The data  are from International  Financial  Statistics
(IFS), sum of line 24 and 25.
- Currency,  C,  is defined  as currency  in  circulation  outside  of  deposit
money banks.  Data  are from IFS  (line 14a).
- Manufacturing  output,  Y, is a seasonally-adjusted  index, with  1990 as
a base period.  The data  are from the International  Monetary  Fund.
- The  trend  component  of manufacturing  output,  YT,  is the  quadratic
trend  which is equal to the fitted  value obtained  by regressing Y on constant
term,  time  and time  squared  variables.
- The discount  rate,  r is from IFS  (line 60).
- The  coefficient of variation  for the  log of  currency  to  deposit  ratio,
CV[ln(C/D)],  and the log of manufacturing  output  to trend component  ratio,
CV[ln(Y/YT)]  are  equal to  the  standard  deviation  of the  specified variable
divided  by  the  average  of it for 3 leads  and  lags,  centered  on  the  current
period.
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Developing  Countries:  Consumer  Price  Inflation  and Inflation  Volatility
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Thailand: Determinants of Excess Liquid Assets
(1992:01-1998:09)
A. Discount  rate  B. Money  market  rate
(1)  (2)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3)
Constant  -21.42  -23.17  -23.94  -16.70  -18.84  -18.37
(10.51)  (9.38)  (6.82)  (10.30)  (9.40)  (7.84)
ln(EL/D)[-O0  0.82  0.82  0.82  0.80  0.80  0.82
(0.10)  (0.09)  (0.07)  (0.10)  (0.09)  (0.06)
Iln(RRID)  -7.73  -8.41  -8.66  -5.90  -6.66  -6.57
(3.84)  (3.44)  (2.56)  (3.77)  (3.47)  (2.94)
CV(C/D)  1.59  1.17  0.77  0.15
(2.58)  (2.45)  (2.56)  (2.39)
CVY/YT  -4.44  -4.50
(7.28)  (7.03)
ln(Y/YT)  5.63  5.25  5.47  5.45  5.10  5.18
(2.23)  (1.85)  (1.41)  (2.08)  (1.78)  (1.41)
Penalty  rate  1.83  0.22  1.42  2.30  2.06  1.15
(9.34)  (8.48)  (8.75)  (2.41)  (2.15)  (2.07)
see  0.391  0.379  0.397  0.376  0.367  0.379
R  2  0.940  0.944  0.938  0.945  0.947  0.944
Note:  The dependent variable in the equations is the (log of) the ratio of excess reserves to deposits, In(EL/D)). The regressors ln(EL/D)[-O],  In(RR/D), CV(C/D),
CVYNT,  In(Y/YT)  and penalty rate denote respectively, the (logs of) the excess reserves to deposits (minus the contemporaneous value) and of the rate of required
reserves to deposits, the volatilities of the ratio of cash to deposits and of output to trend output, the (log of) the ratio of output to trend output, and the penalty rate
proxied by the discount rate (panel A) and the money market rate (panel B). The estimates in the table correspond to the sum of the coefficients of the estimates of
the lag polynomials, a,(L) for p=3 (see text for their precise definition), and their standard errors are shown in parenthesis. T7 and see denote respectively the
adjusted R squared and standard error of the regression.Policy  Research Working  Paper Series
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